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TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF HUMAN 
GERMLINE GENOME MODIFICATION 
Andrea Boggio,* Cesare Romano,** Jessica Almqvist*** 
This book presents eighteen national regulatory regimes for human germline genome 
modification, as well as the international legal framework within which they exist. Had this been 
our only aim, it would have been a worthwhile and thorough update of existing scholarly works, 
but hardly a novel endeavor. However, what no one has so far done is looking at the existing 
national and international regulations through the lens of international human rights standards and 
in particular through the lens of two sets of internationally-recognized human rights: the ‘right to 
science’ and the ‘rights of science’. 
We believe international human rights standards ought to be central to the development of 
germline engineering law and policies for various reasons, the most cogent of which is that these 
rights are legally binding on states, at a minimum because they are written in treaties that have 
been widely ratified, or because they have become part of customary international law. No matter 
how technical or specific legislation regulating germline engineering is, governments cannot 
depart from their international human rights obligations in developing regulatory frameworks. It 
is not just a matter of legality. It is also a matter of legitimacy. International human rights standards 
are the legal articulation of widely agreed upon values. They are expression of an internationally-
negotiated consensus. National regulatory frameworks cannot be consistent only with some human 
rights obligations while neglecting others. They need to be consistent with all of them. 
We are aware our claim will surprise many. The ‘right to science’ and the ‘rights of science’ 
have been rarely invoked in the context of the discussion of the regulation of human genome 
modification. Moreover, the collective understanding of the normative content of the right to 
science – that is, what exactly are states’ specific obligations generated by these rights – is limited, 
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if compared to other human rights. Nonetheless, it is time to take a hard look at current national 
regulatory standards to ask whether they meet international human rights standards, in particular 
the ‘right to science’ and the ‘rights of science’. This is the goal of this final chapter. Here, we 
analyze current national regulatory standards of the selected eighteen countries in light of the five 
foundational principles that a reading of international bioethics law combined with international 
human rights standards suggests. They are: i) freedom of research; ii) benefit sharing; iii) 
solidarity; iv) respect for dignity; and v) the obligation to respect and to protect the rights and 
individual freedoms of others. 
We identified these principles by looking at key international bioethics instruments, and in 
particular the three UNESCO declarations — on the human genome and human rights (1997), 
human genetic data (2003), and bioethics and human rights (2005)) — while also taking into 
account the key provisions of the International Bill of Rights that concern science, including 
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 1 Whether current national 
regulatory standards respect these five principles, and thus meet international human rights 
standards, is the key question we raise in this final chapter.  
This chapter is divided in three sections: I) evidence, where we summarize what emerges 
from a legal and comparative analysis of the national chapters included in this volume; II) analysis, 
in which we discuss the extent to which the current national regulatory standards are consistent 
with the five foundational principles we identified; and, III) recommendations, where we offer our 
vision of an international governance framework that promotes science and technological 
development while being mindful and respectful of international human rights standards as well 
as the different sensitivities with which citizens from different parts of the world approach this 
complex problem. 
As the readers will notice, our analysis focuses mainly on the first two principles: freedom 
of research and benefit sharing. This is because the evidence gathered in the first section points to 
                                                 
1 See, in this book, Ch. 2, Sec. 2.1 and Sec. 3. 
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problems precisely with these two principles, which reflect the primary goals of the right to science 
and the rights of science. We present a short discussion of the other three — solidarity, respect for 
dignity, and the obligation to respect and to protect the rights and individual freedoms of others — 
in the recommendations section. Of course, we hasten to say that the views expressed in this 
chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors who contributed the national chapters to 
this book. 
I) EVIDENCE 
1) Basic Research  
In this study, we defined ‘basic research’ as in vitro or ex vivo studies of germline tissue of 
humans, animals or of the two in combination, done to understand the biological mechanisms of 
germline genome modification. Basic research on germline genome modification can be done 
using either gametes (sperm and oocytes) or embryos.  
a) Basic research using gametes 
Among the countries we studied, the regulation of research using gametes is relatively 
underdeveloped. Very few have rules that apply specifically to the use of sperm and oocyte in 
basic research. In this regard, the Swiss Federal Constitution is an exception. It prohibits any 
“interference with the genetic material of human reproductive cells”, including gametes.2 In 
Singapore, regulations provide that research with oocytes must be treated in the same way as 
research with embryos.3 Protocols of research on oocytes are subject to the full ethical review and 
the preapproval of an institutional review board. 
None of the countries surveyed in this book prohibits the in vitro modification of gametes 
for research purposes. This includes ‘gametogenesis’, the in vitro derivation of gametes from 
iPSCs using gene-editing techniques. Japan and the United Kingdom are among the few countries 
                                                 
2 See in this book, Ch. 15, p. [INSERT]. 
3 See in this book, Ch. 19, p. [INSERT]. 
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in the world that have enacted specific regulation for gametogenesis.4 In both, the regulations 
permit gametogenesis and basic research involving germ cells derived from stem cells but prohibit 
the fertilization of iPSCs-derived gametes.5 Several countries (e.g., Australia, Germany, Spain, 
and Singapore) expressly prohibit clinical applications with gametes used in research.6 
b) Basic research using embryos 
The situation is more complex when basic research is done on embryos. Technically, 
CRISPR-based interventions are more efficient if a CRISPR/Cas9 tool is injected at the time of 
fertilization. This way, the likelihood of ‘mosaicism’ in the resulting edited embryos7 or off-targets 
mutations is lower than when CRISPR/Cas9 tools are used at later stages of development. The 
second-best option is to intervene on one-cell embryos (zygotes). Although off-target mutations 
may still occur, mosaicism is relatively under control. After cell divisions or ‘cleavages’, 
controlling how CRISPR-based interventions affect the embryos is more arduous. 
Currently, basic research with CRISPR-based interventions at fertilization stage and one-
cell stages is possible only in a handful of countries that permit the creation of ‘research embryos’, 
that is to say, embryos that are intended to be used only for research but not reproductive purposes. 
Of the 18 countries surveyed in this book, only seven permit the fertilization of an egg for research 
purposes (i.e. Belgium, China, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and several 
jurisdictions in the United States). Of the other countries, 10 prohibit scientists to create embryos 
for research (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan Mexico, the Netherlands, South Korea, 
Spain, and Switzerland). One, Australia, has restrictions so extensive that amount to a de facto 
prohibition.8 
                                                 
4 See in this book, Ch. 16, p. [INSERT], and Ch. 7, p. [INSERT]. 
5 See in this book, Ch. 16, p. [INSERT], and Ch. 7, p. [INSERT]. 
6 See in this book, Ch. 20, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 8, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 13, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 19, p. [INSERT].  
7 The term “mosaicism” describes a situation in which different cells in the same individual have different numbers 
or arrangements of chromosomes. 
8 Australia’s regulatory framework is very complex. In her chapter, Dianne Nicol concludes that there are “very 
limited avenues for legitimately creating and using embryos for the purpose of clinical and basic research.” See, in 
this book, Ch. 20, p. [INSERT]. 
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It is important to note that, even where producing research embryos is permitted, research 
with gametes and embryos is still tightly regulated. All countries surveyed have adopted in some 
way (law, regulation or guideline) the so-called 14-day rule, which prohibits experimenting on 
embryos fourteen days after fertilization. In addition, scientists must obtain approvals from a 
regulatory agency or an independent body. These approvals are granted only upon showing that 
the statutory requirements are met. 
In Belgium, research embryos can be produced only as a last resort, that is, when the 
research goal cannot be achieved by other means, including resorting to supernumerary embryos.9 
Additionally, basic research must pursue a therapeutic objective; be based on the most recent 
scientific knowledge; meet the requirements of a correct methodology of scientific research; and 
be carried out in an approved research facility and under the supervision of a person who possesses 
certain credentials.10 The statutory regulator is the Federal Commission, which preapproves and 
oversees basic research with research and supernumerary embryos (and with gametes used to 
derive embryos).11 
In Singapore, research embryos can be produced only if scientists demonstrate “strong 
scientific merit” and “potential medical benefit” of the research, the lack of acceptable alternatives 
to achieve the research goals, and obtain approval from a regulatory agency.12 Similar standards 
must be satisfied in Sweden for basic research that uses gametes or embryos that can be traced 
back to a living or deceased donor: respect human dignity; human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; promotion of new knowledge; scientific value of the research; alternative ways to 
achieve the intended outcome; data protection issues; and researcher’s credentials.13  
In the United Kingdom, basic research on human germline genome modification can be 
carried out only after the regulatory authority has issued a license, contingent upon meeting various 
                                                 
9 See in this book, Ch. 9, p. [INSERT]. 
10 Ibid, p. [INSERT]. 
11 Ibid, p. [INSERT]. 
12 See in this book, Ch. 19, p. [INSERT]. 
13 See in this book, Ch. 10, p. [INSERT]. 
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statutory requirements.14 These include: informed consent of tissue donors; showing that the use 
of human embryos is necessary and not merely desirable; an independent research ethics 
committee’s approval of the research; inspection of the research facilities; and a positive review 
of the research proposal by peers.15 
In the United States, the situation is more complex because of its federal system. The 
creation of research embryos is regulated both federally and at state level, with important 
differences. While some states allow the creation of research embryos, others prohibit it.16 Federal 
law does not prohibit the creation of research embryos per se, but federal funds cannot be used to 
support research where scientists edit the genomes of human embryos.17 Preapproval of research 
by a review body that assesses the risks and benefits of the research is typically needed. Yet, 
independent scientists and fertility clinics that refuse federal funds are not bound by these federal 
requirements. They are only subject to the rules of the specific state/s in which they operate.18 
Of the eleven remaining countries discussed in this book, Australia, Canada, France, Japan, 
South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Spain permit research on supernumerary IVF embryos, 
that is, embryos that were produced during an assisted reproduction procedure and are no longer 
wanted, or cannot be implanted because not viable. Unsurprisingly, the six countries that permit 
the creation of research embryos allow also research with supernumerary IVF embryos (i.e. 
Belgium, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and several jurisdictions in the United 
States). 19 Research with supernumerary embryos is subject to limitations similar to those discussed 
above for research embryos: informed consent of tissues donors; need for research protocols to be 
preapproved; ethical oversight; need to show scientific rationale for the use of embryos; meeting 
research standards; and compliance with the 14-day rule. 
                                                 
14 See in this book, Ch. 7, p. [INSERT]. 
15 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
16 See in this book. Ch. 4, p. [INSERT]. 
17 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
18 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
19 See in this book, Ch. 4, 7, 9, 10, 19, and 21. 
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Some countries have set up additional requirements that limit research with supernumerary 
IVF embryos further.20 For instance, in Australia, embryos can be used in research only when they 
are “unsuitable” for assisted reproduction.21 This means that an embryo must have undergone a 
sufficient number of cell divisions to determine that it cannot be used for reproduction. As Dianne 
Nicol notes in her chapter, those embryos are not particularly useful for gene editing research 
“given how damaged these cells need to be declared unsuitable for implantation.”22 In South 
Korea, supernumerary embryos can be used only in research that targets certain rare or incurable 
diseases enumerated by law.23 In Mexico, supernumerary embryos can be used in research that 
benefits a particular embryo (e.g., to eliminate or improve disease of the embryo) but without 
altering the embryo’s genotype. In France, the requirements for using IVF supernumerary embryos 
are so stringent that Blasimme, Caminiti, and Vayena report that, “as of 31 December 2015, out 
of the 20,000 embryos offered by couples to research, less than 10% have been made available for 
research.”24 
Of the countries surveyed, those with the most restrictive laws are Germany, Italy, and 
Switzerland. They prohibit research with embryos. However, research bans are not absolute. In 
Switzerland, embryos can be used in vitro to derive hESCs, but not to do experiments. As 
Blasimme, Caminiti, and Vayena report, embryos cannot be edited, and not even tested, for non-
medical reasons.25 “Given such rules”, the authors conclude, “it is not possible to perform genome 
editing of embryos in Switzerland for basic research purposes.”26 In these three countries, as well 
as in Mexico, embryos can be manipulated, but only as long as the purpose is a therapeutic benefit 
for the specific manipulated embryo. What these countries seem to permit are in vivo and in vitro 
manipulations of embryos27 to correct genetic variations that would determine the birth of a child 
                                                 
20 In this case, the regulation of research with gametes is not relevant because the gametes were procured according 
to the rules regulating assisted reproduction. 
21 See in this book, Ch. 20, p. [INSERT]. 
22 See, in this book, Ch. 20, p. [INSERT]. 
23 See, in this book, Ch. 18, p. [INSERT]. 
24 See, in this book, Ch. 14, p. [INSERT]. 
25 See, in this book, Ch. 15, p. [INSERT]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 With the exception of Switzerland where only in vivo manipulations are permitted. See, in this book, Ch. 15, p. 
[INSERT]. 
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carrying a genetic disease.28 However, at this point, scientists are still far from being able to engage 
in these sorts of germline interventions with confidence, and it is unclear how they can hone their 
skills if they cannot practice. Besides, it is unclear whether these statutes truly permit research 
aimed at editing the variations present in that embryo and, if so, what standard scientists would 
have to satisfy before their research is approved. As the authors of the chapters point out, the 
conclusion that this research is possible is merely speculative, since there are no reports of 
governmental authorities having permitted it, nor of scientists having engaged in this kind of 
research without sanction.29 
That being said, the regulatory framework of most countries neither prohibits nor permits 
germline genome modifications expressly, creating uncertainties for researchers that we will 
discuss later in this chapter. In some cases, while silent as to whether researchers can modify 
gametes and embryos, the regulatory frameworks prohibit using modified gametes and embryos 
to achieve reproduction. If one follows the general legal principle by which everything-which-is-
not-forbidden-is-allowed, the conclusion can be drawn that since the regulators excluded some 
goals of germline engineering, particularly clinical research and applications, they did not exclude 
other goals of germline engineering, particularly acquiring knowledge and basic research. This is 
the conclusion that was reached by the authors of chapters on the six countries that allow the 
creation of research embryos (Belgium, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
several jurisdictions in the United States). 
Overall, the picture that emerges from our comparative analysis of the regulation of basic 
research with embryos and gametes is that this is an area filled with prohibitions and restrictions. 
In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss whether these regulations are excessively 
restrictive given that states must ensure the freedom indispensable for scientific research and the 
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. However, before we move to that 
analysis, we need to address two more issues: the regulation of clinical research and applications. 
                                                 
28 See, in this book, Ch. 8, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 12, p. [INSERT]; and Ch. 15, p. [INSERT]. 
29 It is not clear how these exceptions must be interpreted. We invite readers to read the respective sections of the 
national chapters for more nuanced arguments about the meaning of these clauses. 
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2) Clinical Applications 
Because the regulation of clinical applications is comparatively easier to navigate than that 
of clinical research, let us address first the end of the translational pipeline. In this book, we defined 
‘clinical application’ of human germline genome modification as the use of these techniques on 
patients in a clinical setting. Most countries surveyed in this book prohibit unequivocally the 
provision of germline engineering therapies in a clinical setting. There are statutory prohibitions 
in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Other countries have achieved the same result 
through regulatory mechanisms. For instance, in Singapore, clinical research and applications are 
not allowed as a result of a moratorium issued by the Bioethics Advisory Committee in 2005.30 In 
China, a technical specification of standards for assisted reproduction, issued in 2003 by the 
Ministry of Health, prohibits “gene manipulation of human gametes, zygotes or embryos for 
reproductive purposes.”31 In the United States, while no federal law expressly prohibits clinics 
from providing germline-editing services, the federal legislature has prohibit the federal agency 
from accepting applications to begin clinical research.32 This also means that no gene-editing 
applications can be offered to patients in a clinical setting, since the regulators’ pre-market 
approval is a prerequisite to offering clinical applications.33 
A few regulatory frameworks leave the door open, intentionally or accidentally, to the 
possibility that, in some cases, germline engineering might be used in a clinical context. This is 
the case of Belgium, and also, counterintuitively, of Italy and Mexico.34 This conclusion is reached 
if one keeps in mind the rationale of those national regulatory frameworks, which is to prevent 
embryos from being ‘harmed’ during research. Arguably, interventions that improve the well-
being of the embryo are lawful. This interpretation of the Belgian, Italian and Mexican statutes has 
                                                 
30 See in this book, Ch. 19, p. [INSERT]. 
31 See in this book, Ch. 17, p. [INSERT]. 
32 See in this book, Ch. 4, p. [INSERT]. 
33 Ibid. Yet, we have seen that independent scientists and fertility clinics that refuse federal funds are not bound by 
these federal requirements. 
34 See in this book, Ch. 19, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 12, p. [INSERT]; Ch. 5, p. [INSERT]. 
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not been tested in courts, so the extent to which clinical applications are actually permitted is 
unclear, but the possibility is intriguing. 
Similarly, France permits the study of germline engineering techniques whose primary aim 
is therapeutic (e.g. preventing a genetic disease) rather than altering the descendants of the treated 
embryo. “If that is correct,” Blasimme, Caminiti, and Vayena conclude, “the use of genome editing 
technologies on human embryos that will likely result in germline modifications may not be a 
priori forbidden”.35 
Singapore and Israel appear to leave room for some procedures as long as their safety and 
effectiveness is demonstrated. Specifically, Singapore seems open to certain types of genetic 
germline modification technologies to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial diseases, 
including ooplasmic transfer, pronuclear transfer, and maternal spindle transfer.36 De Miguel 
Beriain and Casabona argue that Spanish law does not ban clinical applications nor basic and 
clinical research using germline modification technologies as long as no new genetic material is 
introduced intentionally into the genome of the embryos.37 
3) Clinical Research 
The regulation of clinical research is less clear-cut and, although in the traslational pipeline 
it comes before clinical application, we present it after the discussion on clinical applications 
because, in some countries, the ban on clinical research is the corollary of a ban on clinical 
applications. Clinical research involves experimenting on a living person, testing therapies on 
patients. Clinical research on human germline genome modification would involve modifying 
germline tissue of the research subject in vivo, or transferring to a research subject gametes or 
embryos that were modified ex vivo (i.e., by transferring a modified embryo in the uterus), to test 
the safety and efficacy of germline genome engineering. All countries surveyed in this volume 
prohibit clinical research. In some countries, the ban is blank or absolute. In other countries, 
                                                 
35 See in this book, Ch. 15, p. [INSERT]. 
36 See in this book, Ch. 19, p. [INSERT]. 
37 See in this book, Ch. 13, p. [INSERT]. 
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exceptions to the prohibition are contemplated expressly, or are revealed by statutory 
interpretation. 
The countries with blank or absolute prohibitions are: Canada, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, Switzerland, the United States,38 and the European Union. In these countries, all clinical 
research involving human genome germline modifications is prohibited. In others, the ban is not 
absolute. For instance, in Israel, the Minister of Health could authorize, through regulations, 
clinical research on and clinical use of genetically modified germline cells, as long as it does not 
violate human dignity and may have therapeutic benefit.39 According to Ravitsky and Ben-Or, the 
exception was designed as “a simpler and more efficient solution than subsequently trying to 
modify the Law” in the event germline-based therapeutic options become available.40 Mexico 
permits clinical applications that have a positive therapeutic effect for the embryo.41 It follows 
logically that clinical research testing the safety and effectiveness of a procedure that is lawful 
should also be lawful. While this is a reasonable interpretation, the fact that the relevant statutes 
authorize clinical applications but not research cannot be ignored. What the legislator may have 
envisioned is that clinical applications that have been tested and approved in a different jurisdiction 
may then be offered to patients in their country. Or it might be simply an accidental omission 
caused by hasty legal drafting. 
Limits to the bans can also be identified by means of statutory interpretation. For instance, 
in Australia only clinical applications of germline modification technologies that cause 
modification that are “intended to be inherited” are prohibited.42 Can germline modifications be 
tested on humans if there is no intent to pass on the modifications to the offspring of the research 
subject? This could be the case when the research subject has agreed to terminate the pregnancy 
after data for the clinical trial are collected. However, in her chapter, Dianne Nicol proposes a 
                                                 
38 In the United States, clinical research is not possible not by virtue of a legislative ban, but rather because the 
legislative branch has barred the FDA from receiving any application for clinical research using germline genome 
modification. See in this book, Ch. 4, p. [INSERT]. 
39 See in this book, Ch. 21, p. [INSERT]. 
40 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
41 See in this book, Ch. 5, p. [INSERT]. 
42 See in this book, Ch. 20, p. [INSERT]. 
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more restrictive reading of the statute: the prohibition of clinical applications “could also apply in 
the research context,” Nicol argues, “where the intention for the genetic manipulation to be passed 
on to future generations is absent, but the intention to modify the genome in a way that could be 
inherited is present”.43 In South Korea, since the law prohibits clinical research with a therapeutic 
goal, one could surprisingly argue that clinical research without a-therapeutic goal (e.g. 
enhancement or aesthetic reasons) is allowed.44 In Japan, although clinical research using germline 
genome editing is largely prohibited, editing that does not involve “the administration of a gene or 
cells” is not prohibited. Acutely, Ishii points out that this could be done if editing is performed 
using a messenger RNA (mRNA) rather than by inserting a plasmid harboring a gene of template 
DNA.45 
In China, clinical trials involving human genome germline modifications seem to fall in a 
legislative vacuum, and therefore there is some uncertainty as to what is prohibited. Research with 
human subjects is subject to regulations that have incorporated the main international standards 
for biomedical research. The Guiding Principles for Human Gene Therapy Research and Quality 
Control of Preparation allow only genetic therapy using somatic, but not germline, cells.46 
However, it is unclear whether the Guiding Principles allow gene therapy on human embryos and 
whether germline genome modifications can be clinically tested on humans. In the wake of Dr. He 
Jiankui’s controversial revelations, the Chinese regulatory and funding agencies and various 
professional bodies issued statements condemning Dr. He’s actions. In a joint statement, the 
Chinese Society for Stem Cell Research and the Committee of Genome Editing, Genetics Society 
of China concluded that “we believe the research led by He is strongly against … the Chinese 
regulations”.47 An investigating task force set up by the Health Commission of China in 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
44 See in this book, Ch. 18, p. [INSERT]. 
45 See in this book, Ch. 16, p. [INSERT]. 
46 See in this book, Ch. 17, p. [INSERT]. 
47 Committee of Genome Editing, Genetics Society of China and Chinese Society for Stem Cell Research, Statement 
“Condemning the Reproductive Application of Gene Editing on Human Germline”, 27 November 2018. 
<http://www.cscb.org.cn/news/20181127/2988.html> accessed 11 December 2018. 
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Guangdong Province released a preliminary report on January 21, 2019, stated that He had violated 
government bans.48 
The situation in Europe is even more complex due to the stratification of regulatory 
instruments. First, of the nine European states surveyed in this book, three (France, Switzerland 
and Spain) are bound to prohibit interventions to modify the human genome for the purpose of 
introducing modifications in the genome of any descendants by virtue of their ratification of the 
Oviedo Convention.49 Then, eight out of nine are members of the European Union. Currently, EU 
Regulation 536/2014 includes a blank prohibition under which EU member states cannot approve 
clinical trials involving the modification of the human genome germline.50 However, before 2014, 
clinical trials were prohibited by a directive. As a general rule, directives are not self-executing, 
and member states must adopt their own laws to reach the policy goals set by a directive. As a 
result, some EU countries had no national legislation or had adopted national laws prohibiting 
clinical research. The Netherlands is the only European country surveyed in this book without a 
statute prohibiting clinical research on germline editing.51 The key Dutch statute prohibits 
“deliberately modifying the genetic material of the nucleus of human germ cells with which a 
pregnancy will be established”.52 As van Beers, de Kluiver and Maas note, “these words suggest 
that human genetic modification is prohibited only for reproductive purposes, and only where 
nuclear DNA is concerned”.53 
All other countries have statutes, some of which contain language that may be interpreted 
as granting certain exceptions to the pre-2014 EU-mandated ban on clinical research on germline 
modifications. The German and Swedish statutes expressly prohibit germline interventions that 
                                                 
48
 XINHUA, Guangdong Releases Preliminary Investigation Result of Gene-Edited Babies, 21 January 2019, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/21/c_137762633.htm> accessed 25 January 2019. 
49 See in this book, Ch. 13, 14 and 15, p. [INSERT]. 
50 See in this book, Ch. 6, p. [INSERT]. 
51 See in this book, Ch. 11. 
52 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
53 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
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are therapeutic.54 The authors of those chapters point that that certain human germline genome 
editing interventions without a therapeutic purpose might fall outside the scope of the statute.55 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, Belgium, France, and Italy permit only germline 
interventions that are therapeutic. Belgium and Italy have statutory language similar to Mexico, 
that is, they permit clinical applications that have a positive therapeutic effect for the embryo. As 
we have seen, one could reasonably argue that clinical research testing clinical applications that 
are beneficial to the embryo is permitted.56 The French Civil Code includes an exception to the 
ban on clinical research allowing for research activities aimed at preventing or treating genetic 
diseases and not at modifying the genetic traits of a person.57 
In the United Kingdom, which soon might be no longer part of the European Union, the 
key statute does not set up a mechanism to evaluate and possibly authorize the clinical research on 
new technologies or treatments. To address this legislative void, Lawford Davies draws a parallel 
with the 2017 approval of the clinical use of mitochondrial donation using a pronuclear transfer. 
Thirteen years after the submission of the proposal for clinical research, the regulators authorized 
the research, but under the strict oversight of the agency and with the obligation that researchers 
apply for permission for each patient and monitor patients’ health scrupulously in follow-up 
sessions. “Should clinical application of human genome germline modification become technically 
feasible,” Lawford Davies concludes, “it is highly likely that a similar process of review and 
consultation will unfold.”58 
II) ANALYSIS 
This is what we learned from the analysis of the selected national regulatory frameworks. 
However, each of those states, as any other state, has international legal obligations that frame and 
constraints their national legal frameworks, including a set of obligations deriving from two 
                                                 
54 See in this book, Ch. 8, p. [INSERT]; and Ch. 10, p. [INSERT]. 
55 Ibid, p. [INSERT] and [INSERT]. 
56 See in this chapter, Sec. I.2, p. [INSERT]. 
57 See in this book, Ch. 14, p. [INSERT]. 
58 See in this book, Ch. 7, p. [INSERT]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435815 
Pre-editing version of the corresponding chapter in Andrea Boggio, Cesare P.R. Romano, Jessica Almqvist (eds.), 
Human Germline Genome Modification and the Right to Science: A Comparative Study of National Laws and Policies, 
Cambridge University Press, 2019 (ISBN: 9781108499873) 
 
16 
specific branches of international law: international human rights law and international bioethics 
law. The international context in which we carry out our analysis should be clear to the readers by 
now.59 However, it is worth reiterating here the key rights that inform our analysis: the ‘right to 
science’, also known as the right of everyone to benefit from scientific progress (benefit sharing), 
and the ‘rights of science’, of which the right to engage in scientific research (scientific freedom) 
is an essential component. 
Both international human rights law and international bioethics law agree that freedom of 
research must be respected. Respecting freedom of research requires states to refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with it,60 and avoiding taking measures that hinder or prevent the 
enjoyment of this right.61 Simply put: scientists must be allowed to engage in scientific inquiries 
freely. However, the ‘right to science’ and the ‘rights of science’ are not absolute rights. They can 
be limited. Restrictions on the enjoyment of these rights are allowed only if they are consistent 
with international human rights standards. Specifically, they require that three conditions are met: 
(1) any restriction must be prescribed by law (condition of legality); (2) any restriction must pursue 
a legitimate aim (condition of legitimacy); and (3) any restriction must be limited to what is 
necessary to fulfill that aim, and be the result of a careful balancing of interests (condition of 
proportionality).62 Governments bear the burden of showing that the restrictions they impose do 
not violate international human rights standards.63 Until this burden is met, states must avoid 
imposing restrictive measures that interfere with the rights to scientific freedom and benefit 
sharing. 
                                                 
59 See in this book, in general, Ch. 2. 
60 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR), General Comment No. 14 (2000) on 
the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), UN doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, paras. 33; General Comment No. 17 (2005) 
on the Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any 
Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author (Article 15.1.c of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN doc., E/C.12/GC/17, 12 January 2006, paras. 28 
61 Analogously, see UNCESCR, General Comment No. 13 (Twenty-first session, 1999) on the Right to Education 
(Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN doc. E/C.12/1999/10, 8 
December 1999, para. 47. 
62 O de Schutter, International Human Rights Law, Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 288. 
63 Analogously, UN Commission on Human Rights, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, para. 12. 
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In the following subsections, we will discuss and critically examine the most important 
limits imposed on the effective enjoyment of the human rights to science in the area of human 
germline engineering. We will pay special attention to the question whether these limits are 
consistent with international human standards and states’ obligations related to these rights. 
1) Restrictions must be prescribed by law (condition of legality) 
According to article 4 of the ICESCR, limitations to scientific freedom must be 
“determined by law” (condition of legality). In broad terms, this requirement entails that the 
“limitation should have a basis specifically in domestic law consistent with the Covenant; the law 
must be adequately accessible; the relevant domestic law must be formulated with sufficient 
precision”, and the law must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or incompatible with 
the principle of interdependence of all human rights”.64 According to the requirement of clear and 
precise laws, captured by the principle of legal certainty, limitations are determined by law only 
when they are sufficiently clear to allow a reasonable person to regulate her conduct based on that 
law.65 The empirical evidence presented in the national chapters shows that, in many countries, the 
laws regulating research on human germline genome modification are excessively vague. This 
raises the question whether laws in place actually provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty as 
required by human rights standards. Before analyzing this question, let us lay out the requirements 
of this principle within the international human rights framework.  
The principle of legal certainty is a “general principle of law common to civilized 
nations”,66 that is to say a legal principle that can be found in the legal system of several, if not all, 
‘civilized nations.’67 Indeed, it is a well-established legal concept, found both in the Civil Law and 
                                                 
64 M Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Hart Publ. (2016), 2nd edition, p. 152, 
p. 152. 
65 Siracusa Principles (n 62), para. 17, according to which “legal rules limiting the exercise of human rights shall be 
clear and accessible to everyone”. 
66
 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Art. 38.1.c. 59 Stat. 
1031 [the Charter], 1055 [ICJ Statute], T.S. No. 993 [I.C.J. Statute at 25], 3 Bevans 1153 [I.C.J. Statute at 1179]. 
67 For a comparative law discussion of the principle, see M Fenwick; M Siems; W Stefan (eds), The Shifting 
Meaning of Legal Certainty in Comparative and Transnational Law, Hart Publ. (2017). The authors show how 
widespread recognition of the principle is, while pointing out that pinning down what legal certainty means and 
when it is violated remains difficult. 
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in the Common Law legal traditions. In Europe, the concept of legal certainty has been recognized 
as one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 
1960s. It is found in all European continental legal systems, those that follow the Romano-
Germanic (Civil) legal tradition.68 In the Common Law tradition, legal certainty is often explained 
in terms of citizens’ ability to organize their affairs in such a way that does not break the law. In 
the United States, the principle of legal certainty is understood as ‘fair warning’ and the ‘void for 
vagueness’.69 In both legal traditions, legal certainty is regarded as grounding value for the legality 
of legislative and administrative measures taken by public authorities.70 The principle is also given 
importance in the context of the UN work on the promotion of the rule of law at the national and 
international levels. Here the rule of law requires legal certainty, and both are an essential condition 
for the full realization of human rights.71 
Invariably, human rights bodies resort to the principle of legal certainty to determine the 
legitimacy of restrictions on human rights. While there is no instrument that speaks directly to the 
limitations of scientific freedom, the UN Human Rights Committee has applied the principle of 
legal certainty to a cognate freedom: the freedom of expression. According to the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression), “a norm, to be characterized as a ‘law’, 
must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct 
accordingly.”72 Restrictions to freedom of expression “shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of 
                                                 
68 For instance, one can find it in the German legal system as ‘Rechtssicherheit’, in France as ‘sécurité juridique’, in 
Spain as ‘seguridad juridica’, in Italy as ‘certezza del diritto’, in the Benelux countries as ‘rechtszekerheid’, in 
Sweden as ‘rättssäkerhet’, in Poland as ‘pewność prawa’, in Finland as ‘oikeusvarmuus’. D Chalmers, European 
Union Law: Text and Materials, Cambridge University Press (2006), p. 454. 
69 E Claes, W Devroe, B Keirsblick, Facing the Limits of the Law, Springer (2009), pp. 93. 
70 Ibid., pp. 92–93 
71 E.g., Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels, UN doc. A/RES/67/1, 30 November 2012, para. 7. For a definition of the rule of law 
mentioning specifically legal certainty, see <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/> accessed 23 
January 2019. 
72 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, 12 
September 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34 , para. 25. 
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national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”73 The parallel 
with Article 4 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is striking. In both cases, 
restrictions on freedom, whether of expression or of research, must be provided by ‘law.’  
Unclear laws are particularly problematic when they provide for criminal sanctions. At the 
international level, the European Court of Human Rights has asserted repeatedly the paramount 
importance of legal certainty in connection with criminal laws.74 Because several countries 
surveyed in this book have chosen to regulate some, if not all, aspect of activities modifying the 
genome of human germline cells through criminal law, legal certainty is paramount. Australia, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, criminalize certain activities connected with using 
human embryos and/or modifying the human genome. Yet, as we also have seen, some of these 
criminal prohibitions lack in clarity and precision. Granted, one could argue that what is not 
prohibited is permitted, and thus, unless research or clinical activity is expressly prohibited, it is 
lawful. Loopholes abound. Nonetheless, scientists are unlikely to take advantage of them and move 
ahead with innovative research when the risk is to be criminally prosecuted. 
In many jurisdictions, the limitations to scientific freedom are contained in laws and 
regulations that are unnecessarily vague. For example, many regulatory frameworks do not address 
research on the human germline expressly, and therefore do not allow scientists to be sufficiently 
confident that their research can be done lawfully. Several fail to give scientists reasonable notice 
of exactly what is permitted and prohibited. Authors of the chapters on Canada, Italy, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden identify key aspects of the regulation of basic research 
                                                 
73 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), Art. 19.3. 
74 C Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publ. (2014), p. 68, pp, 178-181, 
p. 191, and p. 263. Several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights address the issue. E.g. see Kolevi v. 
Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, Judgment, 5 November 2009, page 29, § 174; Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, 
Judgment, 28 March 2000, page 12, § 52; Cantoni v. France, no. 17862/91, Judgment, 11 November 1996, page 14, 
§ 29; C.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 20190/92, Judgment, 22 November 1995, page 12, § 33; S.W. v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 20166/92, Judgment, 22 November 1995, page 13, § 35; Kokkinakis v. Greece, no. 14307/88, 
Judgment, 25 May 1993, pages 17-18, §; Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 
44801/98, Judgment, 22 March 2001, page 26, § 50 ; Malone v. the United Kingdom, no. 8691/79, Judgment, 2 
August 1984, pages 27-28, § 67; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, no. 58/1997/842/1048, Judgment, 30 July 1998, 
page 15, § 46. 
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as ‘unclear’. The authors of the chapters on China, France, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden talk about 
‘uncertainties.’ They give us examples of instances where definitions and substantive provisions 
have not been updated, despite the advent of CRISPR, which has transformed our understanding 
of what constitutes ‘gene therapy’,75 or of instances where new advancements are not expressly 
regulated, as in the case of in vitro gametogenesis. 
Indecipherable laws and regulations have a chilling effect on scientific freedom. Faced 
with muddy regulatory frameworks, scientists likely refrain from doing something that is not 
expressly prohibited. Some authors explicitly acknowledge the chilling effect vague regulatory 
frameworks have on research. Song and Isasi conclude that, in China, “obscurity in the breadth 
and scope of normative instruments, paired with blurred jurisdictional boundaries between 
governmental actors, have created what it seems to be an unstable regulatory environment where 
accountability is uncertain, with chilling effects on research.”76 De Miguel Beriain and Casabona 
note that, in Spain, “the prevailing view amongst scholars is that any intervention seeking to 
modify the human genome that is not for preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic purposes is 
prohibited … has chilling effect on Spanish researchers, who, currently, are not engaging in 
research in this direction.”77 Timo Faltus point out that, in Germany, the ban on human germline 
genome modification “has chilling effects on the funding of borderline research (i.e. research on 
asexually produced embryos, tripronuclear embroys), too.”78 
Consider Article 15.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which recites: “The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development, and the diffusion of science and culture.” We believe that that, whenever laws lack 
the necessary precision, thus inhibiting scientific freedom, governments have failed to take the 
steps “necessary for … the development of science”. These steps “must be deliberate, concrete 
                                                 
75
 J Doudna and E Charpentier, “The New Frontier of Genome Engineering With CRISPR-Cas9” Science, Vol. 346, 
Issue 6213 (2014). 
76 See in this book, Ch. 17, p. [INSERT]. 
77 See in this book, Ch. 13, p. [INSERT]. 
78 See in this book, Ch. 18, p. [INSERT]. 
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and targeted” towards the full realization of this right.79 Incomplete and unclear statutes fail to 
comply with the principle of legal certainty and therefore cannot be considered to be truly 
‘determined by law’. States must take steps to ensure that scientists are in a position to tell with 
reasonable precision whether their research is lawful. As we will discuss in the last section, the 
best way to meet international legal standards is for governments to enact legislation that regulates 
research on human genome germline modifications expressly and clearly.  
2) Restriction must pursue a legitimate aim (condition of legitimacy). 
Clarity is not sufficient. Restrictions must also be justified by the pursuit of a legitimate 
aim (condition of legitimacy). In this regard, article 4 of the ICESCR specifies that the rights the 
Covenant recognizes may be subject “only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of 
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”.80 
What this proviso means and consequently requires is somewhat unsettled. The notion of “general 
welfare” has been understood as “furthering the well-being of the people as a whole”.81 The 
expression “in a democratic society” should be construed as imposing a further restriction to the 
application of limitations by requiring the state to demonstrate that the limitations do not impair 
the democratic functioning of the society.82 According to the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, at the very least it demands that a state ensures that limitations on economic, social 
and cultural rights are “necessary and proportionate and do not interfere with the core minimal 
content of the rights”.83 The requirement that any limitation must be “necessary in a democratic 
                                                 
79 See the following UNCESCR General Comments: No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, para. 
1, of the Covenant), UN doc. E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, para. 2; General Comment 13 (n 60), para. 43; General 
Comment No. 14 (n 59), para. 30; General Comment No. 17 (n 59), para. 25. 
80 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), art 4. At the time of writing, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has not yet adopted a General Comment concerning the interpretation of article 4. 
81 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
adopted in Maastricht on 2-6 June 1986, UN Commission on Human Rights, Note verbale dated 5 December 1986 
from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for 
Human Rights ("Limburg Principles"), 8 January 1987, E/CN.4/1987/17 para. 52. 
82 Ibid., paras. 53-54. 
83 UNCESCR, Concluding Observations, Vietnam, C/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (15 December 2014), para. 8. Also see A 
Müller, “Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Law Review, 
vol. 9, no. 4 (2009): 577-601, referring to the Principles on the Limitations and Derogation from Provisions in the 
ICCPR, E/CN.4/ 1985/4 (1985). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435815 
Pre-editing version of the corresponding chapter in Andrea Boggio, Cesare P.R. Romano, Jessica Almqvist (eds.), 
Human Germline Genome Modification and the Right to Science: A Comparative Study of National Laws and Policies, 
Cambridge University Press, 2019 (ISBN: 9781108499873) 
 
22 
society” implies the existence of a “pressing social need” or a “high degree of justification” for the 
limitation in question.84 
Even if public safety, order, health, or morals are not mentioned explicitly as grounds that 
justify limitations of the Covenant rights, they are generally understood as providing valid grounds 
for limiting not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights.85 
However, although concerns with morals, safety, health or order may be aspects of the “general 
welfare of a democratic society”, to limit a right legitimately on these non-explicit grounds, it must 
be clear that the protection of these concerns is necessary for the promotion of welfare in a 
democratic society. 
Thus, for example, a legislator that invokes safety or health concerns to justify restrictions 
has the burden of explaining how the balancing between the individual right to health and the right 
to health and safety of the many, has been achieved in conformity with the proportionality test. In 
meeting this test, it must be recalled that ‘public health’ may be invoked as a ground “to allow a 
state to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual 
members of the population. These measures must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or 
injury or providing care for the sick and injured.”86 Public safety “cannot be used for imposing 
vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exist adequate safeguards and 
effective remedies against abuse.”87 . Likewise, a state may invoke public morality as a ground for 
restricting rights. However, even if enjoying a certain margin of appreciation, it “must demonstrate 
that the limitation in question is essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of 
the community”,88 and that these values have been identified and discussed through a democratic 
process that takes into account the voices and interests of particularly vulnerable groups and 
minorities. 
                                                 
84 M Ssenyonjo, (n 63), p. 152. 
85 O De Schutter, (n 61), p. 291. 
86 Siracusa Principles (n 62), para. 25. 
87 Ibid., paras. 33-34. 
88 Ibid., para. 27. 
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The rules protecting the rights of research subjects, above all their right to free and 
informed consent, are a typical example of a legitimate restrictions, consistent with the need to 
protect the human rights of others, a legitimate goal. Another limitation accepted in democratic 
societies to promote the general welfare is that scientific research must be done responsibly. 
Scientists have an individual and collective duty to act responsibly. Just because you can do 
something, it does not mean that you will do it and damn the consequences, as Dr. He Jiankui 
did.89 Scientists must adhere to the rules of good research conduct, and the scientific community 
has the duty of, but also the right to, self-regulation, that is, to regulate the scientific enterprise to 
ensure the integrity of the research process and the minimization of misconduct.  
Restrictions must not be arbitrary, lest the condition of legitimacy would be violated. When 
limitations are arbitrary or unwarranted, the freedom indispensable for scientific research is not 
respected. For instance, while Italy bans the creation of embryos for research, Italian scientists are 
reported to import them from abroad to carry out their research.90 It is hard to explain how the 
different protection afforded to ‘national embryos’ and ‘foreign embryos’ can be reconciled with 
the stated purpose of protecting the dignity of the embryo. Even if freedom of research may be 
restricted for reasons of public morality, as has been said, a state that invokes it “must demonstrate 
that the limitation in question is essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of 
the community”.91 In the Italian case, it is unclear what that fundamental value would actually be, 
given the disparity of treatment between embryos created in the national territory and those coming 
from abroad. 
3) Restrictions must be limited to what is necessary to fulfill legitimate aims, and 
be the result of a careful balancing of interests (condition of proportionality) 
Restrictions must not only be the result of reasonably clear laws adopted democratically 
for legitimate goals. They must also be proportional, limited to what is necessary to fulfill those 
                                                 
89 See in this book, Preface, p. [INSERT]. 
90 See, generally, B Forest, “Three Courageous Italian Scientists – An Example for Louisiana”, World Congress for 
Freedom of Scientific Research, 19 Apr. 2010, <https://www.freedomofresearch.org/three-courageous-italian-
scientists-an-example-for-louisiana-by-barbara-forrest/>, accessed 7 March 2017. 
91 Ibid., para. 27. 
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legitimate goals, and be the result of a careful balancing of interests (condition of proportionality). 
Total bans and so-called ne plus ultra prohibitions violate the condition of proportionality. 
a) The prohibition of the creation of embryos  
Of the 18 countries surveyed in this book, only seven permit the fertilization of an egg for 
research purposes (i.e. Belgium, China, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
several jurisdictions in the United States). Of the other countries, ten prohibit scientists to create 
embryos for research (i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan Mexico, the Netherlands, South 
Korea, Spain, and Switzerland). One, Australia, has restrictions so extensive that amount to a de 
facto prohibition.92 
We believe allowing scientists to create research embryos is necessary for them to be able 
to enjoy their freedom of research. As deWert and colleagues noted, “only in countries where the 
creation of embryos for the exclusive purpose of research is allowed could [gene editing] be 
applied at earlier stages and with fresh oocytes and embryos.”93 Research on supernumerary IVF 
embryos is only a second best, because of the limited number of embryos available and because a 
considerable percentage of those have not been implanted because they are either not viable or 
affected by various disorders. Modifying the genome of embryos is better than modifying the 
genome of gametes as the chances of off –target mutations and mosaicism are reduced.94  
We are not advocating unlimited freedom to create any embryos for research. The six 
jurisdictions that permit the creation of research embryos show that it is possible to strike a balance 
between the needs of science and ethical concerns. There, the creation of research embryos is 
limited by various rules, including the requirement to obtain consent from tissue donors, approval 
and oversight, and the ’14-day’ rule. We believe these limitations are compatible with human 
rights standards as their rationale is to protect other human rights (the rights of the research 
subjects) and are enacted democratically. Ethical approvals and oversight ensure that the research 
                                                 
92 (n 8). 
93 G de Wert et al., “Responsible Innovation in Human Germline Gene Editing. Background Document to the 
Recommendations of ESHG and ESHRE”, European Journal of Human Genetics, Vol. 26, n. 4, 2018, p. 450-470. 
94 Ibid., p. [INSERT]. 
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is carried out responsibly, respecting the sensitivities of the societies where it is done. This 
regulatory approach, in our opinion, is the one that best balances freedom and the limits of this 
research because the limitations to scientific research are both appropriate and narrowly tailored. 
b) Ne plus ultra prohibitions 
Several countries allow the translational pipeline to advance only up to a certain point. 
They might allow basic research but prohibit clinical research. We believe these ne plus ultra, or 
blank, prohibitions are difficult to reconcile with everyone’s right to “benefit from scientific and 
technological progress” and the principle of benefit sharing, even when lawful limitations to these 
rights are taken into account.95 Noticeably, Article 15.2 of the Covenant requires governments to 
“take steps … to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for … the 
diffusion of science.” If everyone is to truly enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, biomedical 
knowledge must be allowed to be translated into clinical applications, unless there are legitimate 
grounds for limiting the right. Claims to benefit sharing are particularly strong when knowledge 
might lead to developing new medical treatments that make it possible to cure or even prevent 
diseases that otherwise would be incurable.  
In situations such as these, it is doubtful generic bans meet the legitimacy and 
proportionality tests. When discussing limitations on the right to health, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has noted that when several types of limitations are 
available, the least restrictive alternative must be adopted.96 In this context, it also noted that the 
limitations should be of limited duration and be subject to review.97 Even if some aspects of the 
bans may be justified, it seems important to consider whether they could at least be narrowed 
down. 
                                                 
95 ICESCR, Articles 2.2 and 15.1.b. 
96 See, analogously, UNCESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 59), para. 29. 
97 Ibid. 
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As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Canada, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Switzerland, the United States,98 and the European Union have adopted blank prohibitions of 
clinical research involving human genome germline modifications. In our judgment, blank 
prohibitions to translate basic research into clinical research, which, if safety and efficacy are 
proven, can lead to offering clinical applications to patients, conflict with the right to science 
contained in the Covenant.99 The prohibition to test new cures, or methods to prevent deadly or 
severely impairing diseases that are otherwise incurable, can hardly be said to “promote the general 
welfare in a democratic society”. A more balanced approach that respects the proportionality test 
is needed. Israel is a good example. There, the law prohibits clinical research but leaves to door 
open to cases in which testing germline engineering may be warranted. The power to authorize 
clinical trials under exceptional circumstances is given to the Minister of Health, who can adopt a 
regulation greenlighting experimenting germline engineering on humans.100 This approach is 
similar to the one recommended by influential ethical statements, such as those of the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.101 
These statements reflect a shift in opinion from a blank prohibition to the permissibility of 
translational pathways to germline editing.  
We do not advocate giving researchers carte blanche. They would have to adhere to widely 
accepted standards for clinical research and follow robust pre-clinical evidence supporting the 
clinical promise of modification of the human germline. The National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine recommends, among others, that clinical trials using heritable genome 
editing be permitted only in “the absence of reasonable alternatives … to prevent a serious disease 
or condition … on genes that have been convincingly demonstrated to cause or to strongly 
                                                 
98 In the United States, clinical research is not possible not because of a statutory ban, but rather because the 
legislative branch has barred the FDA from receiving any application for clinical research using germline genome 
modification. See in this book Ch. 4, p. [INSERT]. 
99
 Similar considerations are put forth by R Yotova, The Regulation of Genome Editing and Human Reproduction 
under International Law, EU Law and Comparative Law, Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2017). P. {INSERT]. 
100 See in this book Ch. 21, p. [INSERT]. 
101 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing and Human Reproduction, London: Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (2018); National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Human Genome Editing: Science, 
Ethics, and Governance, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press (2017). 
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predispose to that disease or condition … and [with] reliable oversight mechanisms.”102 
Admittedly, clinical experimentation for reproductive purposes seems to be premature at this point 
in history. However, while it would be untimely to do germline genome editing with the intent of 
bringing that possible future child to birth, blank prohibitions of clinical research fall short of 
international human rights standards. They inhibit a conversation about what clinical research 
should and could look like, and whether it can be carried out promoting the “general welfare in a 
democratic society.” As Bryan Cwik persuasively argued prior to Dr. He Jiankui’s stunt, “it’s 
important to consider seriously what would be required for the conduct of ethically sound clinical 
trials of [gene editing]. Human germline gene editing raises a new set of ethical issues that are 
extremely difficult to resolve by current ethical guidelines and regulations.”103 
4) Obsolete regulatory frameworks violate the conditions of legality, legitimacy 
and proportionality 
We believe obsolete regulatory frameworks fail to meet the conditions of legality, 
legitimacy and proportionality. Even if they may have met them in the past, restrictive measures 
on the right to science and the rights of science, such as any other Covenant right, must be reviewed 
on a regular basis in the light of changing circumstances, lest they would not be any longer 
‘adopted by law’, ‘necessary’ or ‘proportionate’. 
Human rights courts and other bodies “constantly stress that they interpret human rights in 
accordance with changing structures, values and priorities of societies”.104 Article 4 requires states 
to adopt and upkeep laws that are appropriate, in the sense of being abreast with new scientific 
developments. States have an ongoing obligation to revise laws as science and technology 
advances and to ensure that, when progress is substantial and clear enough, a broad public dialogue 
takes place as to ensure existing regulations reflect current societal values.105 If they do not, or do 
                                                 
102 Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
103 B Cwik, “Designing Ethical Trials of Germline Gene Editing”, New England Journal of Medicine, 377 (2017), p. 
1911-1913. 
104 A Müller,” Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Law 
Review, vol. 9 no. 4 (2009): 557-601, at 560-561. 
105 See, A Chapman, 'Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its 
Applications' (2009) 8 Journal of Human Rights 17-18 (the author states her agreement with the findings the 
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not any longer, then these regulations cannot be considered anymore as promoting the welfare of 
the democratic society under present-day conditions: they have become obsolete and must be 
reformed. 
Indeed, as all the other rights recognized in the Covenant, the obligations created by the 
right to science are not necessarily fulfilled once and for all by ‘one-time’ measures. Under Article 
2.1 of the Covenant, states must take steps to discharge their obligations with a view to “achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” As repeatedly noted by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the “progressive realization” of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant means that states parties have a “specific and continuing obligation to 
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of these rights, 
logically including the right to science and the rights of science.106  
In the case of the regulatory frameworks of heritable genome editing, only Japan has 
adopted a regulatory framework in recent times (in 2014). Only a handful of other countries (e.g. 
France, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have undertaken formal 
policy discussions on germline engineering in the past five years. The others surveyed in this book 
have laws in that were drafted, debated, and enacted in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, well before 
the advent of CRISPR.107 To wit, Mexico adopted its key statute regulating basic research on 
germline engineering in 1982 and 2002;108 Germany in 1991;109 China adopted various instruments 
                                                 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, pointing out that ‘limits on freedom of inquiry must be carefully set, must 
be justified and should be reevaluated on an ongoing basis’); National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning 
Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Rockville, MD: 
NBAC (1997). 
106 See UNCESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 78), para. 9; General Comment 13 (n 60), para. 44; General 
Comment No. 14 (n 59), para. 31; General Comment No. 17 (n 59), para. 26. 
107 CRISPR-Cas9 first appeared in the scientific literature in 2012. See, M Jinek and others, “A Programmable Dual-
RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity”, Science, Vol. 337 (2017), p. 816. 
108 The 1982 law was amended in 2011. See in this book Ch. 5, p. [INSERT]. 
109 See in this book Ch. 8, p. [INSERT]. 
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between 1993 and 2003;110 Switzerland in 1998 and 2003;111 Australia and the Netherlands in 
2002;112 Canada,113 France;114 Italy,115 and South Korea in 2004;116 Spain in 2007.117 
These prohibitions or restrictions have not yet been re-examined in light of the recent 
advancements in gene editing technology. The advent of CRISPR has fundamentally changed the 
cost-benefit analysis.118 While in the 1990s and 2000s the costs of human germline genome 
modification were clear while benefits were speculative, now the benefits are coming into focus. 
The regulatory frameworks adopted before the advent of CRISPR must be re-examined to be up-
to-date with new scientific developments if the goal of achieving progressively the full realization 
of the human right to science, both scientific freedom and benefit sharing is to be reached. Where 
no public legislative debate took place in recent times, in spite of new important scientific 
developments, can it be argued that the purpose of those restrictions is still the protection of the 
“general welfare in a democratic society”? 
Even the sacrosanct 14-day rule, the current prevailing universal standard, should be open 
to re-discussion should our understanding of what happens around that threshold change, or our 
values change.119 The 14-day rule was adopted about 30 years ago as an acceptable compromise 
between those who believe human life begins at fertilization, and those who believe the early stages 
of development do not yet constitute a human life. Since then, it is widely considered to be an 
acceptable balance between the moral imperatives of religious beliefs and the need to advance 
                                                 
110 The regulations of research with human subjects were adopted in 2016. See in this book Ch. 8, p. [INSERT]. 
111 See in this book Ch. 15, p. [INSERT]. 
112 See in this book Ch. 20, p. [INSERT], and Ch. 11, p. [INSERT]. 
113 See in this book Ch. 3, p. [INSERT]. 
114 In 2013, the French Parliament changed the default rule from a ban (on using human embryos for research 
excepting supernumerary embryos) to permissibility (of research with supernumerary embryos upon prior approval 
and under tight oversight). See in this book Ch. 14, p. [INSERT]. 
115 See in this book Ch. 12, p. [INSERT]. 
116 See in this book Ch. 18, p. [INSERT]. 
117 See in this book Ch. 13, p. [INSERT]. 
118 G Daley, R Lovell-Badge and J Steffann, “After the Storm — A Responsible Path for Genome Editing”, New 
England Journal of Medicine, 16 Jan 2019. [Epub ahead of print]. 
119 FS Collins and S Gottlieb, “The Next Phase of Human Gene-Therapy Oversight’ New England Journal of 
Medicine, Vol. 379 (2018), p. 1393, 1395; G Cavaliere, “A 14-day Limit for Bioethics: the Debate Over Human 
Embryo Research”, BMC Medical Ethics, Vol. 18 (2017), p.38; I Hyun, A Wilkerson & J Johnston, “Embryology 
Policy: Revisit the 14-day Rule”, Nature, 4 May 2016, p. 169. 
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science.120 The 14-day rule is a “legal and regulatory line in the sand that has for decades limited 
in vitro human-embryo research to the period before the ‘primitive streak’ appears.”121 That being 
said, the 14-day rule “was never intended to be a bright line denoting the onset of moral status in 
human embryos.”122 Instead it has been a “theoretical [line respected] until now because scientists 
have been technologically incapable of moving past the 14-day threshold.”123 However, recent 
developments have raised the question of further extending the possibility of researching on 
embryos beyond 14 days. Until 2016, culturing human embryos in-vitro had never gone beyond 
nine-days.124 In 2016, human embryos were sustained in-vitro for 12-13 days.125  
Obsolesce of regulatory frameworks is certainly not a new problem in science and 
technology law and policy, or a problem only of science and technology law and policy. As often 
happens with disruptive scientific and technological breakthroughs, lawmakers are struggling to 
adjust the regulatory frameworks with these developments. Elen Stokes refers to this problem as 
one of ‘inherited rules.’ “New technologies”, she points out, “do not always elicit new regulatory 
responses. More often than not, policymakers deal with new technologies by deferring to existing 
regulatory regimes”.126 However, the fact that this problem occurs “more often than not” does not 
make it acceptable. Indeed, it directs attention to the fact that the Sisyphean task of meeting human 
rights obligations is a never-ending enterprise that requires legislative bodies to be well- informed 
about new developments with a view to revise and update laws accordingly. 
CRISPR is a significant scientific and technological advancement that has accelerated the 
timeline of clinical applications based on germline engineering becoming available to patients. It 
                                                 
120 J Harris, “It’s Time to Extend the 14-Day Limit for Embryo Research”, The Guardian, 6 May 2016. 
121 I Hyun, A Wilkerson & J Johnston, “Embryology Policy: Revisit the 14-day Rule”, Nature, 4 May 2016, p. 
[INSERT]. The appearance of the “primitive streak” (i.e. a transient structure whose formation marks the start of the 
process in which the inner cell mass in converted into the three germ layers: ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm) 
signals that the individuality of an embryo is assured. 
122 Ibid. p. [INSERT]. 
123 M Kaplan, “Call to Re-Examine “14 Day Rule” Limiting In-Vitro Human Embryo Research”, Case Western 
Reserve University of Medicine, Press Release 4 May 2016, <https://casemed.case.edu/newscenter/news-
release/newsrelease.cfm?news_id=302> accessed 15 March 2017. 
124 Ibid.  
125 Revisit the 14-day rule (n 120), p. [INSERT].  
126
 E Stokes, “Nanotechnology and the Products of Inherited Regulation”, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 39 
(2012), p. 93.  
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is a game changer, one that puts in question how governments have regulated human genome 
germline modifications in the past, and that calls “for a broad public dialogue about these 
technologies and their applications”.127 Obsolete legislation may not reflect how the public values 
the benefits and risks of heritable genome editing. Governments must engage legislatures, 
ministerial bodies, national science councils and other venues for public engagement to ensure that 
regulatory frameworks adopted years before the advent of CRISPR are adjusted to how to best 
promote the welfare in a democratic society considering the opportunities offered by new 
technology and scientific progress here and now, not a decade ago.128 
III) RECOMMENDATIONS 
To conclude, as a recommendation, we would like to sketch what we believe a regulatory 
framework for human genome germline modifications that is informed by international human 
rights law and, more specifically, the right to science and the rights of science should look like. 
To begin, we believe the primary responsibility for regulating heritable gene editing falls 
on (legitimately elected) governments rather than international organizations or civil society 
bodies. International law creates obligations that national governments must discharge to ensure 
progressively the full realization of human rights in the area of scientific and technological 
progress, not least the human right to science. International organizations or civil society bodies 
can play an important governance role in supporting the implementation of these obligations. 
However, they cannot substitute the role national governments are expected to play. 
As with the rest of the rights recognized in the Covenant, the right to science and the rights 
of science imply different sets and levels of obligations. The key obligations governments have in 
this regard are to “respect, protect, and fulfill” everyone’s rights to contribute scientific progress 
(scientific freedom) and to enjoy such progress (benefit sharing).129 As discussed in the previous 
                                                 
127 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and 
Governance, The National Academies Press (2017), p. 163. 
128 Ibid. 
129 See the following general comments by the UNCESCR, General Comment 13 (n 60), para. 46; General Comment 
No. 14 (n 59), para. 33; General Comment No. 17 (n 59), para. 28. According to these, the obligation to protect 
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section, the ‘obligation to respect’ requires that governments do not interfere in the enjoyment of 
the right to science unless they have a legitimate reason for doing so, one that is based on science 
and actual risks, as opposed to political opportunity and speculation. However, just as important 
to our analysis is the ‘obligation to fulfill’. This obligation translates into the creation of a legal 
framework and a regulatory environment that is conducive to the effective enjoyment of the right 
to science, both scientific freedom and benefit sharing.130 The same obligation requires states to 
“adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures” towards the full realization of the rights to science.131 At a minimum, governments are 
expected to adopt legislative measures that allow a person to exercise or enjoy scientific freedom 
and benefit sharing effectively. As we discussed in the previous section, this requires, inter alia, 
that the legal framework is sufficiently certain and up-to-date.132 In taking legislative measures, 
governments are expected to engage legislatures, ministerial bodies, national science councils and 
other venues for public engagement to ensure that regulatory frameworks reflect current values in 
their respective societies.  
From a policy perspective, legislative measures in the biomedical field must guarantee, as 
a default rule, the freedom to engage in basic and clinical research and to make safe and effective 
treatment, therapies and other applications available to patients in a clinical setting.133 In regulating 
heritable gene editing, legislative measures must guarantee, again as the default rule, scientists’ 
freedom to use CRISPR, and any other gene editing tools that might be invented in the future, to 
create and modify human gametes and embryos, and identify reasonable opportunities for 
translational pathways of therapies to cure heritable genetic disorders. 
                                                 
requires states also to prevent third parties from interfering in the enjoyment of the right to science. This issue will 
not be discussed in this chapter. 
130 Analogously, UNCESCR, General Comment No. 13 (n 60), para. 46. 
131 Analogously, UNCESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 59), para. 33; and General Comment No. 17 (n 59), para. 
28. Also see UNCESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 78), para. 9. 
132 Article 2.1 of the ICESCR limits state duties to ‘taking steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’ 
133 The rules governing access to clinical applications are better analyzed within the framework of the right to health, 
which exceeds the scope of our analysis. On the international human rights to health, see, in general, J Tobin, The 
Right to Health in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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We recognize that this is a controversial area of science and that not all societies are willing, 
at least for now, to move forward with heritable gene editing, even if the goal is strictly therapeutic. 
Human rights law accommodates this diversity of viewpoints by establishing that the human right 
to science, which incorporates scientific freedom and benefit sharing, is not absolute. As it has 
already been mentioned several times before, according to Article 4 of the Covenant, rights can be 
restricted by law for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
Governments may, and in certain cases must, restrict scientific freedom and benefit. They can 
certainly ban applications of gene editing techniques to enhance humans or for cosmetic reasons, 
if they democratically and lawfully decide to do so.  
We believe blank prohibitions, such as those banning all research on human embryos and 
all clinical research, to be in violation of international law. Limitations based on safety health 
considerations are easier to defend since preclinical research has so far failed to show that germline 
engineering is sufficiently safe to be experimented on humans, due to the risk of off-target 
mutations and mosaicism. However, states must discharge the burden of proving an actual risk to 
health and safety and explain how and why the health of the many trumps the right of those who 
are sick to be cured. In addition, the only lawful prohibitions are those determined by law, and law 
must be sufficiently clear. Given the transformative nature of CRISPR, prohibitions that date back 
a decade or two, cannot be considered to have been truly democratically accepted. These issues 
need to be debated again and, only if a broad agreement is reached in favor of prohibiting this kind 
of research applied to humans, as it happened in the case of the 14-day rule, limitations will be 
acceptable. 
We want to stress that we do not argue against the need for restrictions on freedom of 
research and benefit sharing, when necessary to ensure respect for the fundamental values of the 
community. Such restrictions might allow national governments to accommodate considerations 
of ethical or religious diversity, and give some margin for societies to choose the appropriate speed 
at which they wish to participate in innovation. The international human rights framework allows 
countries to choose, in consideration of their available resources, as long as they use their resources 
to the maximum, to be at the forefront of innovation to develop a regulatory framework favorable 
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for making advances in the area of gene editing. This is another reason to entrust national, rather 
than international, lawmakers to find the right balance between the right to science and the rights 
of science and their limitations. The goal is to promote science and technological development 
while being mindful and respectful of international human rights standards as well as the different 
sensitivities with which citizens from different parts of the world approach this complex problem. 
That being said, national policies must fulfil article 2 of the Covenant, which requires the 
progressive realization of the rights. 
They must also be in accordance with Article 15.3, which requires governments to 
encourage and develop “international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural 
fields”. International cooperation is particularly important in germline genome engineering. The 
scientific and technical complexities of this field demand scientific efforts that transcend national 
boundaries and often involve scientists from multiple countries. These efforts may take the form 
of collaborations among researchers across borders, pooling and sharing resources and expertise, 
and validation of results with scientists traveling to other countries to attend meetings, to visit labs, 
to lecture, or to access resources and expertise. National policies must enable international 
cooperation, especially since only a few countries have chosen to be at the forefront of innovation 
in this field. When clinical applications become reality, international cooperation will foster 
exchanges that ensure the sharing of benefits to patients of countries that have chosen a more 
conservative approach. International bodies have a role to play as facilitators of regulatory 
harmonization, custodians of knowledge of best practices and current regulations, and as 
promoters of a global conversation on how innovation can be balanced against other 
considerations. 
The framework we propose must also ensure that other human rights are protected. The 
rights of research participants are particularly important in this area. Any research must be carried 
out in accordance with international standards of research involving human subjects, of which the 
right to free and informed consent is the first. In addition, research preapproval and oversight, 
which are commonplace in biomedical research, are necessary to ensure a responsible exercise of 
scientific freedom. To the extent possible, legal frameworks must be narrowly tailored, and be 
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limited to setting out basic guarantees, leaving space to the scientific community for self-
regulation. Here, we see an important role for scientific societies, expert bodies, and ministerial 
bodies to design “soft law” instruments, such as guidelines and ethical standards, in accordance 
with international human rights standards. These instruments might then be embraced by funding 
agencies or professional bodies, thus empowering either government agencies or the scientific 
community to monitor best practices. The ideal framework must also incorporate considerations 
of solidarity. In the context of heritable gene editing, solidarity translates into rules guaranteeing, 
at minimum, fairness in access, nationally and transnationally, to the clinical applications of 
germline engineering, outlawing any form of genetic discrimination, and ensuring 
intergenerational equity.134 These are important goals, which cannot be fully articulated within the 
limits of these conclusions. It suffices to say that, if proper legal mechanisms are in place to ensure 
that these policy goals are achieved, some of the objections to heritable gene editing would be 
defeated and the public would likely be more willing to support its legalization. Considerations of 
solidarity can inform policies with regard to cost of treatments (if treatments are expensive and 
thus unaffordable to some), to reproductive tourism (if treatments are only available in certain 
countries and thus only available to those who can afford to travel to foreign countries), and genetic 
enhancement (if everybody can ‘enhance’ their offspring, at least fairness is no longer an issue). 
Finally, as to the elephant in the room, the governance framework must be respectful of 
human dignity. That is required by all existing international regulatory standards. However, what 
respecting human dignity entails is a question that we do not intend to settle here. The concept has 
always been and remains undefined, and probably humanity will never agree on a clear definition 
of it. That being said, we believe it is essential to distinguish between different concepts of dignity. 
The concept of human dignity in the sense of autonomy, rank or status of human beings, should 
not be confused with other uses of dignity. When Christian theology stresses the absolute worth 
and sacredness of human life from the time of conception, it stretches the concept beyond what is 
accepted in international human rights. International human rights law’s understanding of dignity 
                                                 
134 ICESCR, Article 2.2; UNCESCR, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (2009). More in-depth analysis of the intersection between 
equity, right to health, and right to science would be necessary, but it exceeds the scope of this book. 
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is limited to the protection of the autonomy, rank and status of human beings and to the furtherance 
of the highest attainable level of health. Although international law upholds the rights to science 
and to health, and in this sense is inclined to promote scientific progress and applications that 
strengthen the protection of these rights, it does not settle the question of the status of embryos as 
such, or whether it is contrary to dignity to interfere with gametes or embryos. From an 
international human rights perspective, once a person is born, genetically modified or not, she has 
the same rights and freedoms as all others. If her genes have been modified, she is no less of a 
person with dignity than someone whose genes have not been modified. 
The question whether the current regulatory framework for human germline genome 
engineering should be eased is giving rise to ethical and moral disagreements in pluralistic 
societies. On one extreme, there are believers and religious authorities that demand full respect for 
the absolute worth and sacredness of human life from time of conception. Indeed, these demands 
often translate into claims not just about the need to ban human genome germline modification, 
but also stem cell research and other experiments involving the use of human embryos, and 
beyond, to abortion and end-of-life issues. At the other extreme, there are those who defend the 
need for scientific progress to cure serious diseases and human suffering, even if it requires 
modification of the germline of embryos. For them the duty to make use of novel scientific tools 
to assist people to attain the highest attainable standard of health made possible by new scientific 
developments overshadows any other consideration.  
In a democratic society, which is a society characterized by pluralism, tolerance and broad-
mindedness, no particular view is acceptable a priori. No one has the right to impose their view on 
the rest through laws and regulations or fait accompli. Moral and ethical disagreement and the state 
of evolving technology demand some form of debates, possibly open, inclusive and transparent. 
International human rights law, including the right to science and the rights of science, should 
frame and inform these debates. The rights in focus in this volume point to some fundamental 
interests of humans that may have not been considered fully, such as the universal right to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific research and all its applications, as well as the right to scientific freedom 
within the limits established by international human rights law. The same rights also point to the 
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need for democratic debates concerning how to meet the international obligations that flow from 
these rights. Let the debate begin.  
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